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High levels of public debt, pressure on government 
expenditures, and existing financial regulations are some 
of the existing barriers to increasing the level of social 
investment in Europe. However, given the long-term 
challenges the European Union (EU) is facing, increased 
efforts in deploying social investment strategies are needed 
now more than ever. Such strategies imply investing in 
people’s capabilities and social infrastructures, but also in 
social innovation and the delivery process of public goods 
and social outcomes. This is crucial to address current 
market failures in the social sector and to ensure that 
existing investment can prompt greater levels of social 
cohesion and territorial convergence. 
Given the long-term challenges the 
European Union (EU) is facing, increased 
efforts in deploying social investment 
strategies are needed now more than ever.
At the centre of such strategies lies the question of 
financing. Traditional approaches and means of financing 
(i.e. grants and public transfers) are most likely to fall 
short. That is why using alternative avenues to deliver 
social investment is essential. In this regard, the potential 
of financial instruments and impact finance is key and 
the EU must lead the way into a new paradigm shift in 
financing social investment. The EU’s upcoming budget 
period (2021-2027), including the InvestEU programme, 
offers a unique opportunity to support such a paradigm 
shift. To achieve this objective the new EU leadership 
should aim to: (1) ensure that financial regulation is not an 
obstacle to social investment; (2) support social innovation 
throughout its entire production chain; and (3) integrate 
national social investment strategies into the larger 
European framework.
BACKGROUND: THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL 
INVESTMENT TODAY
The idea of social investment entails that social spending is 
an investment in human and social capital that brings long-
term returns, as it enhances individuals’ capabilities from 
an early stage and supports various measures throughout 
their life. According to the social investment approach, 
individuals should be enabled to take an active role in 
society and the economy1; the resulting effects are a more 
competitive economy sustained by a healthy, skilled and 
resilient workforce, reduced costs on corrective measures 
and a greater level of economic and social cohesion. This 
approach is more relevant than ever in the light of ongoing 
socio-economic transformations. However, it will fail to 
provide the expected results if this is not coupled with a new 
financial strategy.
The urgency of social investment
 
An ageing population, new labour market structures and 
persisting social issues are some of the socio-economic 
realities that are currently transforming European 
societies. Their impact is likely to put further pressure 
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on Europe’s social model as well as on its cohesion and 
convergence objectives. In fact, an ageing population 
and societal changes will increase the demand for social 
care and support services. There will be more need for 
elderly care – the share of people aged 80 years or more 
is expected to more than double by 20802 – and growing 
female employment (58% in 2001 and 67% in 2017 in the 
EU)3 increases the need for early childcare. Additionally, 
urbanisation will demand more affordable housing in 
cities. Furthermore, in the current ‘knowledge economy’, 
the demand for high-skilled and knowledge-intensive 
jobs will only rise more.4 This will require advanced 
education and, most importantly, continuous learning. 
Finally, persisting poverty5, rising economic and social 
inequalities6 as well as growing regional disparities need 
to be tackled thoroughly.
If member states fail to do so, such trends will further reveal 
the inadequacy of their welfare states to deliver solutions to 
pressing challenges, which are worsened by the decreased 
level of public investment.
A decreased level of public investment
 
Despite a return to economic growth, public investment 
is yet to reach pre-crisis levels. Government investment 
in the EU was at a record low in 2016 (2.7% of GDP), with 
the lowest level (2.1%) in the peripheral and crisis-hit 
countries (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,  
and Spain).7
The reduction in public investment has also affected social 
investment, be it in social infrastructures or intangible 
assets. All in all, the investment gap in social infrastructures 
in the EU is estimated to be between €100 and €150 billion 
every year.8 Additionally, 35% of EU municipalities report 
that public infrastructure investment is underfunded, 
especially in transport and social housing.9 
All types of social investment have come 
under pressure due to two main reasons: 
a decrease in traditional forms of social 
investment financing, and the limited use 
of other sources of investment.
Intangible social investment has also suffered. Expenditure 
in education, for example, has fallen from 5.2% of EU28 GDP 
in 2010 to 4.6% in 2017. In some countries, the reduction 
in expenditure is significantly larger than the average. In 
Estonia for example, education expenditure fell from 7.2% to 
5.8% of GDP; in Ireland from 4.7% to 3.3%; and in Romania, 
from 3.8% to 2.8%.10
In a nutshell, all types of social investment have come under 
pressure due to two main reasons: a decrease in traditional 
forms of social investment financing (i.e. grants and public 
transfers), and the limited use of other sources of investment 
(e.g. financial instruments).
Social investment and financial instruments
 
What explains the scarcity of private investors in a sector 
with a large investment gap? Previous research has pointed 
out some key characteristics of social (infrastructure) 
projects that deter private investors. First, and despite 
some exceptions (e.g. hospitals), social infrastructure 
projects tend to be small compared to others and important 
investors often prefer to invest in one large project instead 
of a multitude of small ones. Only 1% of them requires 
an investment of more than €30 million.11 Second, social 
investment funding is often provided to the public 
authority implementing the project, thus making the 
likelihood of repayment highly dependent on the regulatory 
environment. If it is perceived to be unstable, investors will 
not take the risk. Third, social investment returns have a 
long-term horizon and are difficult to calculate monetarily. 
Conversely, investors often require precise estimates of 
economic returns in the short-term. Fourth, there is a 
lack of a ‘common language’ between investors and social 
practitioners. While the former tend to focus on monetary 
returns, scalable projects and short-term projections, the 
latter value long-term societal returns that are obtained 
through smaller projects and are closer to individuals. 
Additionally, they lack common experiences. Social service 
providers traditionally deal with public authorities  
(i.e. providers of grants) rather than with private investors.
STATE OF PLAY: SOCIAL INVESTMENT AND 
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS IN THE EU – FROM 
POLICY TO PRACTICE
Growing attention at the EU level
 
The significant risks that territorial disparities pose to 
the EU, its economic strength and political viability have 
already been widely recognised. Significant efforts have 
been made by the EU to boost its weakest regions, not least 
by providing support to social policies and investing in 
people through its structural funds. Most of these funds 
co-finance social investment programmes through grants, 
and evidence indicates that they have helped mitigate 
disparities. However, their size and functioning cannot 
offset some larger (market) forces that are at work, nor can 
they eradicate all obstacles to improved convergence.12 For 
instance, the limited capacity of certain territories to absorb 
money and administer impactful, innovative programmes 
cannot be solved by simply providing additional finance.
The EU has tried to address the general lack of investment 
in Europe by setting up new mechanisms to attract public 
and private investors and by making use of innovative 
financial instruments such as guarantees or equities. The 
biggest newly-established instrument in that respect is the 
European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI), a guarantee 
of €26 billion, complemented by a €7.5 billion allocation 
of the EIB’s own capital, which was launched in 2015. The 
objective for the EIB Group – the EIB and the European 
Investment Fund13 – was to unlock additional investment 
of at least €500 billion by 2020, and facilitate investment in 
projects with a high-risk profile. Both social infrastructures 
and projects were defined as one of the EFSI’s targeted 
areas. Several additional relevant instruments – such as the 
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EUSEF (the European social entrepreneurship funds), EaSI 
(the EU programme for employment and social innovation), 
or the most recent pan-European advisory platform for 
social outcomes contracting – focusing on boosting social 
innovation and supporting social impact finance have also 
been part of the EU efforts. However, despite the relevance 
of such initiatives in facilitating the emergence of new 
business models, their leverage effect and capacity to 
mobilise a critical mass to finance social investment cannot 
be compared with instruments such as EFSI.
EU financial instruments for social investment: What are 
the lessons learnt?
 
EFSI achievements have already been widely recognised; 
the greatest success being to leverage over €398 billion 
across the EU for investment projects.14 In addition, social 
service providers strongly welcomed the reference to 
social infrastructures and projects in the EFSI regulation,15 
although they expected a bigger impact. Only about 4% 
of the total EFSI has been devoted to social investment 
until now, the main reasons being the lack of viable project 
proposals, the absence of a strong economic model for much 
of said projects, and their size.
That being said, concluding that financial instruments 
are inadequate to finance social investment based on the 
limited impact of EFSI in the social area would be wrong. 
Even if it remains underfunded, there is a growing interest 
from policymakers, investors and the banking sector to 
finance social investment differently. Social investment 
has been successfully intensified by the EIB in recent years 
(amounting to more than €8 billion in 2015 and 2016)16 and 
is part of the usual business of several financial institutions 
at the national and regional level. 
Concluding that financial instruments are 
inadequate to finance social investment 
based on the limited impact of EFSI in the 
social area would be wrong.
More concretely, several social projects have recently 
received EIB support, showing that social providers, 
investors and the banking sector can successfully work 
together and deliver positive social outcomes. For example, 
the EIB has given a 25-year loan amounting to €160 million 
to the Swedish municipality of Örebro to support its social 
investment strategy through several small schemes in the 
fields of childcare, education, municipal housing and more. 
This project shows how small social projects can be bundled 
together under one umbrella investment programme. 
Another example is the EIF’s €10 million investment in a 
social impact bond scheme together with the private fund 
manager Epiqus and the Finnish Ministry. The scheme 
provides training and job-matching assistance for the 
integration of migrants and refugees in the Finnish labour 
market. Investors are remunerated when the desired social 
impact is achieved, creating an alignment between societal 
and monetary returns. By sharing risks between public and 
private investors, this innovative instrument shows how to 
attract more private finance in the delivery of social services. 
Furthermore, the European Investment Advisory Hub 
(EIAH), which forms part of the Investment Plan for Europe, 
has offered advice to several social impact initiatives, such as 
seventy-five primary health care centres in Austria.
PROSPECTS: TOWARDS A REAL MARKET FOR 
SOCIAL INVESTMENT
With the new EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 
for the 2021-2027 period currently under negotiation, it is 
high time to turn good practices into a shared and more 
widely spread paradigm shift on how to finance social 
investment. The European Commission’s (EC) initial 
proposal for the next MFF offers a unique opportunity: 
it suggests launching the InvestEU programme, building 
on the experience of EFSI and backed by an EU budget 
guarantee of €38 billion. Social investment and skills feature 
as one of the priorities of InvestEU and will receive €4 billion 
of the available budget guarantee.17 If properly used and 
accompanied by the right measures, this instrument  
could be a major catalyst for creating a market for the  
social economy and for mobilising investors on social  
impact investment. 
However, such a paradigm shift will not happen overnight 
and without some systemic changes and major preparatory 
work. More concretely, there is a need for the EU to 
concentrate on three main tasks: (1) to ensure that financial 
regulation is not an obstacle to social investment, (2) to 
support social innovation throughout its entire production 
chain, and (3) to integrate national social investment 
strategies into the larger European framework.18
Task 1 – Adjust financial regulation with long-term 
investment objectives
 
In the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis, the 
main objectives were to increase stability in the financial 
system, promote transparency, restore market confidence, 
and limit risk-taking. A number of European reforms were 
taken in this direction, while also encouraging pro-cyclical 
behaviour. For instance, the requirement for solvency capital 
was raised, favouring immediate liquidity and discouraging 
long-term investment. In addition, the value at risk of 
market products is now calculated on a shorter horizon  
of one year, thus ignoring long-term commitments  
and returns.
However, long-term investment requires some risk-taking 
as well as diversification and long-term management of 
assets. These considerations need to become a central part 
of financial regulation, which in turn must serve Europe’s 
long-term objectives and social investment needs. It is 
essential to establish a differentiated regulation for short-
term and medium- to long-term investment to make social 
investment projects more attractive for investors. Changes 
in financial regulation are therefore crucial to mobilise 
a diversity of actors around the social impact finance, 
including the largest investors, and, at the same time, 
correct the mismatch between the mainstream financial 
products and the specific needs of the social economy.
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Task 2 – Support social innovation throughout its entire 
production chain
 
Social innovation follows a long production chain, ranging 
from the identification of the social issues to be solved, 
to the set-up of the project methodology, to the access to 
finance, and the impact evaluation. Despite the existence 
of good practices in each of these different stages, there is a 
general lack of knowledge across actors and EU regions. The 
EU is the ideal entity to bridge the gap. To do so, it needs to 
start by developing a metrics based on existing successful 
examples that can provide sufficient guidance on project 
methodology and calculation of return investment. Such 
metrics could be developed by the EIAH, while serving the 
development of other social impact financial instruments 
that will not get the support of InvestEU. Such metrics 
needs to be part of a wider capacity-building strategy where 
the EU helps each individual member state to identify the 
different actors and investors that could play an active role 
in the social economy of their country and help build a 
solid market infrastructure. Such guidance and technical 
assistance need to be more intense in regions where social 
issues are the most acute and where the expertise in social 
impact finance is low. These preparatory work and mapping 
exercise are essential to complement the provision of access 
to finance and ensure that the needs of the social economy 
can be turned into proper market demand.19
Task 3 – Integrate national social investment strategies 
into the larger European framework
 
Elements of Task 2, i.e. the development of a metrics as 
well as an EU-wide mapping exercise of social investment 
needs, should lay the ground for setting up national 
social investment strategies that InvestEU and other EU 
instruments, such as the EU structural funds, need to 
support. Such strategies should clearly demonstrate how 
a variety of actors come together to address the most 
pressing social issues faced in each country. Beyond the 
use of the EU structural funds, it should also outline where 
and how InvestEU and other financial products could help 
address member states’ weaknesses previously identified in 
different strategic documents, such as the National Reform 
Programmes, or the country reports, which, in turn, must 
be in line with the Sustainable Development Goals and the 
European Pillar of Social Rights. Lastly, the national social 
investment strategy needs to be fully integrated into EU 
cohesion policy and become a central part of the partnership 
agreements that will be signed between the European 
Commission and individual EU countries.
To conclude, tapping into the full potential of financial 
instruments for social investment is imperative. The 
challenges that ongoing trends pose to European societies 
will not be solved without the active and large contribution 
of the private and financial sectors. Both of them need to 
play a central role in the development of co-creative and 
impactful solutions for systemic social change. The outgoing 
Commission has done significant work to prepare the 
ground for the well-needed paradigm shift, but a lot remains 
to be done to ensure real changes on the ground and a 
large-scale impact. It is now up to the next EU leadership 
to intensify the efforts and make Europe a global champion 
of the economy of well-being. If not, pressing challenges will 
escalate into real threats to the stability of our societies and 
the sustainability of the European project.
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